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ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
STATE CONTROL OVER LOCAL FINANCE UNDER THE
N. I.R.A.
The present economic situation has created a serious industrial
emergency which the federal government has undertaken to re-
lieve through legislation. To this end Congress has enacted the
National Industrial Recovery Act, the stated intention of which
is, "To encourage national industrial recovery, to foster fair com-
petition, and to provide for the construction of certain useful pub-
lic works, and for other purposes."' The act necessarily con-
flicts with the powers of the states and undertakes to regulate
matters which have heretofore been recognized as coming within
the exclusive jurisdiction of the state, as opposed to the federal
government.
One of the provisions which has attracted a particular amount
of discussion is section 203 (d) of the Public Works Division of
the National Recovery Act. The act provides for the creation of
a Federal Emergency Administration of Public Works by the
President to prepare a comprehensive program of public works
and authorizes the President to construct, finance or aid in the
construction or financing of any public works project named and
to make grants to states, municipalities or other public 'bodies up
to 30 per cent of the cost of the labor and materials employed.
The particular section referred to in this note states that, "The
President, in his discretion, and under such terms as he may pre-
scribe, may extend any of the benefits of this title to any state,
county or municipality notwithstanding any constitutional or
legal restriction or limitation on the right or power of such state,
county or municipality to borrow money or incur indebtedness."2
A great many state constitutions expressly prohibit municipali-
ties and other subdivisions of the state from incurring indebted-
ness above a certain amount.3 These restrictions upon the bor-
rowing power of the cities and counties are for the purpose of
curbing the taxing power and restraining excessive expenditures
I Public Law No. 67, 73d Cong. 1st Sess., approved June 16, 1933.
2 N. I. R. A., Title 2, sec. 203 (d).
3 The Missouri Constitution affords a typical example of such a prohibition.
Article X, sec. 12, provides that no county, city, town or other political sub-
division of the State be allowed to become indebted in any manner to an
amount exceeding in any year the income and revenue provided for such year,
without consent of two-thirds of the voters voting on such proposition; and
if the voters have assented, indebtedness may not be incurred to an amount ex-
ceeding 5 per cent of the value of the taxable property therein; except that
cities having a population over 75,000 may become indebted up to 10 per cent
on the value of the taxable property therein. There are certain exceptions
relating to the City of St. Louis and to indebtedness for construction of roads
and in the provision for sinking funds, but as a whole the matter of municipal
indebtedness is rather closely limited.
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entailing tax burdens and defaults upon indebtedness. They
were the outgrowth of necessity. During the period after the
Civil War cities grew with great rapidity. But because the
progress of municipal institutions and services failed to keep
pace, their growth was accompanied by graft, bossism and debt,
the results of governmental inefficiency, corruption in municipal
office and the spoils system. Also, it was an era of extensive
railroad building, and counties and towns, in their eagerness to
secure the right of way, subsidized the railroads far beyond their
financial ability. The period between 1860 and 1870 is known
as the dark ages in municipal development and led to a complete
reorganization of local government by the states.4 One of the
measures adopted was the placing of constitutional restrictions
upon the creation of indebtedness of cities, counties, and towns in
order to preserve the good credit of the local subdivisions.
The question at once arises as to whether the National In-
dustrial Recovery Act can supersede state constitutional pro-
visions in this matter of prescribing debt limitations. Munici-
palities are instrumentalities of the state, created by it for the
purpose, among others, of exercising some of the sovereign powers
of the state. The power to create municipalities properly belongs
to the several states and the federal government has no control
over them whatsoever. The Federal Constitution contains spe-
cific grants of power to Congress and imposes definite limitations
upon the exercise of its authority. The Constitution expressly
declares that all powers not given to Congress or prohibited to the
states are reserved to the states or to the people.5 The courts
have repeatedly recognized the proposition that "it is a necessary
condition of our dual form of government over the same terri-
tory that neither the national nor the state governments should
interfere with the proper functioning of the other." 6 The theory
of the division of powers between federal and state governments
is a fundamental element of political organization in the United
States.
Nevertheless the federal government has increasingly extended
its power into fields which formerly were recognized as subject
to state control exclusively. The commerce clause in the Consti-
tution, giving Congress the power to regulate interstate com-
merce, has been used to justify interference by the federal govern-
4 Munro, Government of American Cities (4th ed. 1931) p. 32; Munro,
Government of the United States (1919) p. 580; A. F. MacDonald, American
City Government and Administration (1929) p. 64.
5 Constitution of the United States, Amendment X.
6 Willcuts v. Bunn (C. C. A. 8, 1929) 35 F. (2d) 29; Weston v. City Coun-
cil of Charleston (1829) 2 Pet. 449; McCulloch v. Maryland (1819) 4
Wheat. 316; Macallen Co. v. Massachusetts (1929) 279 U. S. 620.
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ment in functions formerly executed by the states when the
purpose of legislation was not actually the protection of inter-
state commerce, but was intended for the purpose of providing a
solution of some social problem, such as the operation of lotteries
and examination of foodstuffs.7 The power to establish police
regulations within the states belongs to the states exclusively
but they cannot exercise such power if it in any way interferes
with the power of Congress to control interstate commerce. Thus
it has been held that while a state may pass sanitation laws, and
laws for the protection of life, liberty, health or property within
its borders; while it may prevent persons and animals suffering
under contagious or infectious diseases from entering the state;
while for the purpose of self-protection it may establish quaran-
tine and reasonable inspection laws, it may not interfere with
transportation into or through the state, beyond what is abso-
lutely necessary for its self-protection. It may not under cover
of exerting its police powers, substantially prohibit or burden
either foreign or interstate commerce.8 City ordinances regu-
lating traffic are subject to review to determine whether or not
they interfere with interstate commerce. 9
Possibly the closest analogy to the present problem is in the
field of taxation. It is a recognized principle of constitutional law
that the agencies by which either the state or the federal govern-
ments immediately and directly exercise their sovereign powers
are immune from each other's taxing power.10 But, as Mr. Jus-
tice Stone points out, in his opinion in the case of Metcalf v. Eddy
and Mitchell," just what instrumentalities of either a state or
the federal government are exempt from taxation by the other
cannot be stated in terms of universal application. Thus the em-
ployment by the federal and the state governments of officers
who are agents to administer their laws, or their obligations sold
to raise public funds are so intimately connected with the neces-
sary functions of government as to fall within the established
exception. 12 But it is apparent that not every person who uses
his property or derives a profit, in his dealings with the govern-
72 Willoughby, Constitution of the United States (1929) p. 746.8 Hannibal and St. Joseph R. R. Co. vs. Husen (1877) 279 U. S. 620; Must
Hatch Incubator Co. v. Patterson (1927) 32 F. (2d) 714; Evans v. Chicago
and N. W. Ry. Co. (1909) 109 Minn. 64, 122 N. W. 876; M., K. and T. Ry. Co.
v. Haber (1897) 169 U. S. 613.
9 People's Rapid Transit Co. et al. v. Atlantic City (1929) 105 N. J. L.
286, 144 A. 630.
10 McCulloch v. Maryland, n. 6, above; Dobbins v. Erie (1842) 16 Pet. 435;
Purnell v. Page (1903) 133 N. C. 125, 45 S. E. 534.
11 (1926) 269 U. S. 514.
22 Pollock v. Farmers' Loan and Trust Co. (1895) 157 U. S. 429; Collector
v. Day (1870) 11 Wall. 113.
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ment, may clothe himself with immunity from taxation on the
theory that either he or his property is an instrumentality of
government within the meaning of the rule. "As cases arise,
lying between the two extremes, it becomes necessary to draw the
line which separates those activities having some relation to
government, which are nevertheless subject to taxation from
those which are immune. There is no formula by which that line
may be plotted with precision in advance. The guiding principle
to control its operation is the reason upon which the rule rests.
The essential requirement of our constitutional system is that the
federal government must exercise its authority within the terri-
torial limits of the states and the rule rests on the conviction that
each government in order that it may administer its affairs
within its own sphere, must be left free from undue interference
by the other. Neither government may destroy the other nor
curtail in any substantial manner the exercise of its powers.
Hence the limitation upon the taxing power of each, so far as it
affects the other, must receive a practical construction which
permits both to function with the minimum of interference each
with the other; and that limitation cannot be so varied or ex-
tended as seriously to impair either the taxing power of the
government imposing the tax, or the appropriate exercise of the
functions of the government affected by it." ' 13
Similarly, the problem raised in the quoted clause of the Na-
tional Industrial Recovery Act is to determine whether or not
the provision so interferes with the exercise of state powers as
to be contrary to our constitutional system of government. On
the one hand we have the power of the state to control local
government and on the other, the right of Congress to provide
for the general welfare.14 Just where the line is to be drawn
between the two depends in each case upon a practical construc-
tion and should have regard to the circumstances disclosed. In
this case the power of municipalities to borrow money and incur
indebtedness is essential to their existence and, therefore, one
13 Metcalf v. Eddy and Mitchell, n. 11, above.
14 Art. 1, sec. 8, of the Constitution of the United States provides that Con-
gress shall have the power "to lay and collect taxes, duties, imposts and
excises and pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general
welfare of the United States." Among the purposes enumerated in the
preamble for the securing of which the Constitution is ordained and estab-
lished is the promotion of the general welfare. The general nature of the
Constitution and end sought to be obtained was to subserve the national
interests of the people who framed and adopted it. 1 Willoughby 78. The
federal welfare clause is used to finance those subjects of legislation which
Congress in its wisdom determines are for the general welfare of all of the
people generally and any program to relieve unemployment and stimulate
business is of such nature.
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of the most important subjects of control by the state. Lending
money to the states and their subdivisions to construct public
works ought not to be considered of such importance to the gen-
eral welfare as to sanction interference with the exercise of this
power by the state. Nor will the public works program fail if
Congress does not advance loans to municipalities which are pro-
hibited from borrowing. Not all state constitutions limit the
borrowing power and where there is only a statutory prohibition
the state legislature can find means of avoiding it. New York,15
Rhode Island' 6 and Virginia 17 have already enacted measures to
overcome statutory loan bars.
The doctrine that constitutional limitations may be ignored
during an emergency cannot properly be invoked to justify the
provision under discussion. Although the presence of an emer-
gency is an important factor in constitutional interpretation and
may result in the restriction of the normal rights of the individual,
it does not afford a blanket exemption from constitutional limita-
tions, nor convert a federal into a strongly centralized system of
government. 18
A related problem involving the power of the federal govern-
ment to legislate with reference to local government has been
presented by the proposed Wilcox Bill.19 This bill provides for a
municipal debt readjustment amendment to the Federal Bank-
ruptcy Act to permit a municipality that is financially embar-
rassed, or its creditors of any class, to enter a federal court and
apply for relief. The court may appoint a receiver for the
municipality, collect its finances, disburse them, repudiate the
remainder or adjust them, and, in effect, discharge the city or town
in bankruptcy in the same manner as an individual. The object
of the bill is to check the growing list of municipal defaults.
However, the American Bar Association has opposed the measure,
claiming that it is an invasion of state powers and that it will
encourage tax delinquencies. In stating his objections to the bill,
Clarence E. Martin, former President of the American Bar As-
sociation, declared that, "This is giving the federal courts a power
over subdivisions created for the purpose of exercising one of
the sovereign powers of the state. If the federal government
can be given that power, why not lodge within the jurisdiction the
other powers of municipal government, and completely destroy
and eradicate the thought of local government. If any of the
2r Mandelbaum Bill. Laws of 1933, chap. 782.
10 Chap. 26 of the Acts passed by the extra session of the General Assembly
of Rhode Island in 1933.
17 Public Laws of 1933, chap. 2078.
18 3 Willoughby, Constitution of the United States (1929) sec. 1035.
19 New York Times, March 19, 1933.
Washington University Open Scholarship
NOTES
states have permitted municipalities within them to become in-
debted beyond their power to pay, the state which created them,
having given the power, must assume the responsibility. '20
One procedure in dealing with bankrupt municipalities has
been for the state legislature to repeal the city charter and ap-
point a receiver to administer its financial affairs and pay the
claims of creditors. Upon repeal of the charter the public prop-
erty of the city passes under the immediate control of the state
and such property is held, therefore, not to be subject to the pay-
.ment of the debts of the city.21 Nor may private property of indi-
viduals within the territory of the city be subjected to the payment
of the debts of the city, except through taxation.2 2 The Supreme
Court of the United States, in the case of Meriwether v. Garrett,
decided that taxes levied according to law before the repeal of the
charter of the city of Memphis, other than such as were levied
in obedience to the special requirement of contracts entered into
under the authority of law, and such as were levied under the
judicial direction for the payment of judgments recovered against
the city, cannot be collected through the instrumentality of a
court of chancery at the instance of the creditors of the city. The
power to levy taxes is one which belongs exclusively to the legis-
lative department and it necessarily follows that the regulation
and control of all the agencies by which taxes are collected must
belong to it.2 3 Thus the courts can reach and apply to the pay-
ment of the debts of the municipal corporation only the private
property of the corporation, such as it held in its own right for
profit or as a source of revenue, not charged with any public use
or trust.24
The Public Works Administration itself realizes that any at-
tempt to override state constitutions in respect to the limitations
on the borrowing power of municipalities would be futile. Sec-
tion 203 (d) absolutely states that the President may, in his dis-
cretion, grant loans notwithstanding contrary provisions in state
constitutions. Yet in a memorandum prepared by Assistant Gen-
eral Counsel Foley of the Public Works Administration it is stated
that "Where the restrictions are constitutional, 25 it is of course
necessary to go through the cumbersome process of constitutional
amendment. And in such a case the Public Works Administra-
20 Martin, The Growing Impotency of the States (Oct., 1933) 19
A. B. A. J. 531.
21 Meriwether v. Garrett (1880) 102 U. S. 472.
22 Lyon v. City of Elizabeth (1881) 43 N. J. L. 158; Meriwether v. Garrett,
n. 21, above.
23 Meriwether v. Garrett, n. 21, above.
24 Meriwether v. Garrett, n. 21, above.
210 St. Louis Post-Dispatch, Oct. 19, 1933, at p. 1, sec. II.
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tion is helpless, because the much discussed section 203 (d) does
not give the President blanket power to override state constitu-
tions." The change of policy on the part of the administration
with respect to this provision is very significant. Although Sec-
retary Ickes had previously announced that as a matter of policy
the federal government would not make loans to municipalities
where such action was prohibited by the state constitution, this
statement goes farther and practically admits the complete lack
of power to do so.
These considerations point to the conclusion that the attempt
by Congress to advance public work funds to any state, county or
municipality, notwithstanding any constitutional or legal restric-
tion on the right or power of such state, county or municipality to
borrow money or to incur indebtedness is unconstitutional, since
it is an encroachment by the federal government upon the
sovereign powers reserved to the states.
EVELYN HONIGBERG, '35.
PRECEDENTS FOR FEDERAL BANK DEPOSIT
INSURANCE
The Banking Act of June, 1933, creates a Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation the stock of which is to be subscribed for
by the United States Treasury, the Federal Reserve Banks and
members of the Federal Reserve system. Federal Reserve
Banks are required to own shares to the amount of one-half of
their surplus on January 1, 1933; member banks to the amount of
one-half of one per cent of their total deposit liabilities, to be
adjusted annually, subject to emergency assessments of an addi-
tional one-fourth of one per cent. Dividends may be declared.
Upon the closing of an enrolled bank the Corporation is to act as
receiver and pay insured depositors 100 per cent of their claims
up to $10,000, 75 per cent thereafter up to $50,000, and 50 per
cent of the amount of the claim in excess of the last sum. It is
then subrogated to the rights of these depositors until the amounts
of the insurance payments are recovered. The act is to go into
effect July 1, 1934. A temporary Deposit Insurance Fund is pro-
vided to begin January 1, 1934. State non-member banks may
participate in the scheme for a period of two years from this
date.'
This specimen of the new legislation, unlike many of its com-
panion pieces, possesses a definite parentage and history. The
guaranty of deposits is not new in state annals; early appear-
112 U. S. C. 264.
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